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No one doubts that the American industrial history of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth 
century was dominated by the development of large-scale industry, but its impact on the 
economics community is less known. Recent historical literdture has tended to assume that 
economic commentators of that period viewed their newly capitalist economy through the 
freshly ground lenses of "marginal" economics, and that what they saw was the development 
of neoclassical type monopolies charging high prices. I It may be that the recently received 
wi sdom is peninent to the period after the turn of the century, when the climate of opinion 
and of commentary began to change following the big merger movement in manufacturing of 
1895-1904, anci when prices began to rise in the economy.l Before this time, the evidence 
suggests that economists observing the phenomenon, interpreted it as a new type of 
competition rather than in tenns of monopulies (either neoclassically or classically 
conceived)] This difference is not one uf semantics, rather it indicates a crucial difference 
in perspective. nlis paper outlines the contemporary response to the changing nature of 
competition in late-nineteenth century America and interprets it as an attempt to come to 
terms with a new economic phenomenon by providing explanations for its emergence and 
sal ient characteristics. 
, Living s t o n (1967) is o ne g ood example, another is Sklar (1966) . For 
a more a cc urate des c ripti o n and sensible judgement of the extent of 
ma r g inal thinking in Ameri c an c ir c les bef o re 1900, see Goodwin (1973) and 
f ootno te 6. In an imme nse literature o n the history of American trust 
leg islati o n , few have dealt with the questi o n of underlying competition 
t heor ies; no table exc epti o n s are Letwin (1965) who gives a brief discus.ion 
o f c l ass i c al and e vo luti o nary no ti o ns, and Hofstadter (1964) who discuss •• 
t he f ounda t i o n o f the dnt i - tru s t mo v e me nt o n the · c ompetitive c reed- of 
Ame l icdn thinking . 
Bull oc k 's contempo lary (1 90 1) surve y arti c le suggests a recent 
change o f t o ne And pa c e in d e aling with the policy issues. 
, Williams (1990) rightly po ints t o the impo rtanc e of Mill's ideas on 
na tural mo no po ly in the po li c y r es po ns e of American economists, but n4tur&1 
mo no po lies played only a small part in their analysis of the new 
competiti o n . La c k of spa c e prevents me from dealin9 with the policy i •• ue 
in t his paper . 
I The phenomena of the "new competition". 
The period after the Civil War and up to around 1900 was an era of massive structural 
change in the U.S. economy. In a period of rapid growth throughout all sectors, the economy 
was transfonned from a predominantly agricultural economy to a state of highly developed 
industrial capitalism within a period of around 30-40 years. The diminished role for 
agriculture and concomitant growth in industry had been accompanied by a marked change 
within industry. Its concentration from many smallish firms, to a few large firms, and finally 
to the fonnation of "trusts" or "combinations", was associated in the contemporary mind with 
greater efficiency and lower prices. By the late 1890s, these combinations (acting as cartels 
or as corporate entities) had come to dominate large sectors of the supply of raw materials 
(eg Standard Oil) through to their fin al manufac tured products (eg Duke ' s tobacco empire). 
The development of the combinations and the competitive behaviour of large finns were 
believed to be peculiarly American phenomena, moreover, ones that had arisen with stanling 
rapidity.' 
American economists born in the mid-nineteenth century were impressed by these rapid and 
severe changes in the economy, which challenged their perceptions of the nature of 
competition and shaped their ideas. Competition was vividly at work before their very eyes. 
Except by shutting those eyes, and talking to no-one, they could not avoid giving their 
professional opinion on the new phenomena nor escape the issues posed by their side-effects, 
good and bad. They mostly interpreted what they saw as evidence of a new Conn or type of 
competition, "modern competition", different from the competition envisaged (and 
presumably, experienced), by the classical authors. 
Great Britain's competitive experience had not changed very much 
over the nineteenth century . Germany was developing the same s o rt of big 
business elements, but they did not appear to generate the same competition 
problem. See Chandler and Daems (1980) for a comparative view from 
economi c historians. See Marshall (1890) for a contemporary view. 
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The structure of the situation is similar 10 the recent discovery of AIDS . Here was a case of 
a new phenomenon. which was early recognised to be both of major public and medical 
importance. Scientists sought explanations of the appearance of the AIDS virus. health care 
professionals worried about the disease's characteristics. and neither found much help in 
previous medical knowledge. The impact of the "new competition" was similar in many 
respects. American economists of the period 1880-1900 responded to the new competition at 
work between large firms. often in both the academic and more popular press. re-examining 
the ir theories of competition . twisting old ones and constructing new ones. in their attempts 
to account for the new phenomena. They developed definite views on what competition was 
and what it would do. but there was no shared understanding. Their literature reveals a 
variety of ideas: competition could be an activity. a process. a game. an economic institution. 
an agency of natural laws. or even a fundamental law of nature. The perceived outcomes 
were equally diverse. Competition was admired as the regulator of the economy. or as the 
generJ tor of growth and progress. but feared as the selector which judged between the fit and 
the unfit in the struggle for existence . 
Let me suggest another a priori reason why we might find an unusual degree of diversity in 
economists' thinking. In tenns of the standard demarcations in the history of economic 
thought . American economists of this period were trJnsitional in two senses. They sat on the 
saddle -point between the earlier classical school and the later neoclassical school. on the 
bri nk of accepting the marginal revolution but not yet fully convinced of the value of looking 
at the world solely through the spectacles of psychological motivation (see Goodwin. 1973). 
They were also transitional in the sense of representing the last generation of supposedly 
derivat ive American economi sts (taking their ideas from Scottish. English. French and 
Ge rman thinkers) and the first generation to develop a distinctive American way of doing 
economics (see Dorfman. 1949). Knowing this . we should expect to find a variety of views 
on competition amongst the economists of this period. and we do. 
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The new ideas were not simply various combinations of what came before and afler. Their 
general tenor was very different both from those of the later neoclassica l views assumed in 
most historical analyses and from those of the classical economists who came before.' The 
twentieth century neoclassical analysis of competition presents "perfect competition" as the 
antithesis of "monopoly". Under perfect competition, there are many firms who are passive 
price takers - they do not actively compete according to any common sense definition of the 
word (as Backhouse (1990) notes). The single monopolistic firm sets its own price, above 
that prevailing under competition - but it also does not actively compete with other firms. 
These limiting cases mould an analysis which is large ly static . Marginal conditions are 
essential, but, as the contents of Stigler 's 1957 paper testify, the other condi ti ons or 
assumptions made are equally important in determining the outcome. Further, Stigler points 
out, after 1871 (following Jevons' work) the notion of the market became inseparable from 
the notion of competition. When neoclassical economists talk of the market, they often mean 
the structure of the industry not the relations between buyers and se llers as would be the case 
for classical economists. Thus a competitive market for neoclassical economists usually 
means an industry with many sellers (paradoxically , a market in which they do not actively 
compete). 
In contrast to the above stylised version of neoclassical ideas which permeates the historical 
thinking about the period, American economists of the late-nineteenth century thought along 
rather different lines. Instead of the duality of perfect competition and monopoly, they 
believed in a continuum of competitive behaviour: that between many firms, competition 
There appears to have been remarkab ly littl e hi stori ca l study of 
the concept of competition . Stigler's 1957 survey paper s uggests that 
classical economists did not bother to define competition very exactly, 
while the history of the neoclassical con cept amounts t o the development of 
its conditions (or assumptions) . Dennis' more substantive treatment (1977) 
begins with the early pre -c lassical developmen t of the idea , then follows 
it into the era o f -free competition - and its subsequent transformation 
into ·perfect competition - under the neoc lassi c al economists. He makes 
little reference to the American work discussed here . Backhouse (1990) has 
useful insights . 
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between few finns, and competitive behaviour by monopolies. Instead of the passive non-
, 
competition exhibited by both "perfectly competitive" finns and monopolists, American 
economists observed and analyzed both the active competition of finns across their spectrum, 
and the changing nature of competitive behaviour over time. 
Market behaviour for these economists meant exactly that, the behaviour of buyers and 
sellers in the process of exchange. They had a richer view of the dynamics of competition 
practised between finns, which, they believed, might alter market relations and rules of 
behaviour, so that competitive behaviour and market conventions were related, but they were 
not conflated. Similarly, competitive behaviour was also connected with industrial structure, 
but this was not the only detenninant of competitive mores as in the neoclassical case. For 
example, many American economists had begun to use a marginal analysis of individual 
decisions by the end of the century, and it played an important part in at least one analysis of 
the competitive behaviour of monopolists, but it was by no means the only, or even most 
imponant, detenninant of competitive decisions in their understanding.' 
The classical authors that the American economists of the late nineteenth century most read 
and admired were Smith and Mill (see Dorfman, 1949, p81). Yet Mill, despite his famous 
dictum that "only through the principle of competition has political economy any pretension 
to the character of a science" (Mill, 1848, Bk 11, Chap IV, p284), thought that "custom" was 
at least as imponance as competition in deciding prices. Smith's Wealth of Nations was a 
more useful resource : two of his notions of competition found their way into American 
th inking. One of these was "free competition" meaning unrestricted trading of goods and 
factors, in contrast to controlled trading due to mercantilist policies (and at the extreme, 
Goodwin (1973) de sc ribes how marginal elements were assimilated 
into American thinking in the l870s and l880s without becoming d ominant in 
the econo mi c analysis or c Ausing any re volutionary change in the ideas of 
the day . In the late l890s and 1900s, marginalism did became more 
important, but it still remained adulterated by earlier trends and did not 
necessa rily dictate the respo nse to poli c y problems . 
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legally founded monopolies) (Bk I, Chap VII, p54-5). The other notion was linked to 
individual behaviour, and its working was described most persuasively in the situation of 
excess or insufficient effectual demand for a good, when "a competition" arises between the 
buyers or the sellers to adjust supply to demand.(Bk I, Chap VII , p50-2). A similar usage 
occurs in discussing rival owners of capital competing in the same industry to lower profits 
to their "natural state".(Book I, Chap X, p 102-7.) Competition was here an active state, a 
non-continuous activity; it occurs when things have got out of joint and provides an 
adjustment process in the economy.' 
American economists found classical economics a good resource, both of ideas to attach, and 
of ideas to attack, but they were not without other cultural and intellectual resources. Many 
had studied in Germany in their youth. They formed pan of an emergent social science 
community undergoing professionalisation and seeking to become scientific, but also active in 
public affairs. And they interacted with a wider American social, scientific and intellectual 
community which embraced evolutionary thinking and pragmatism.' But, and this is a point 
1 would like to stress, these economists were not theorizing in ivory towers (even ivory 
towers shared by others) , they were living in a vibrant and increasingly commercialized 
economy. They were influenced by their own observations and perceptions of new 
phenomena in this economy, and they intertwined their theories of competition with their 
interpretation of the evidence in their economic writings. 
1 Backhou se (1990) points out the a c tive state o f competition in 
Smith . Stigler (1957) maintains the no tion is that o f · rivalry in a ra ce·. 
(1 find this notion unsatisfac t ory because it mis s e s the interac ti ve 
elements which lurk in mos t descripti o n s of compet ition). Both refer t o 
classical competition as a process o f response . Ba c khouse also discusses 
the ·perfect liberty· notion of Smith, whi c h 1 think i s equ i va l e nt t o the 
classical -free competition-. 
The cultural / intellectua l influence has been we ll doc umented in 
studies of social Darwinism by Hofstadter (1 9 44) and Bannister (1979) and 
of laissez-faire beliefs by Fine (1957) . On the devel o pment o f American 
social science see Ross (1991) . 
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The main body of this paper outlines the views of five economists chosen to represent the 
boundaries of American economic opinion on competition. The five are J.B. Clark, A~T. 
Hadley, R.T. Ely, W.O. Sumner, and T.B. Veblen (and other economists will also be referred 
to in passing). These economists were born between 1840 and 1857 and their lives cover the 
century through to 1943. Nearly all their work which I discuss falls into the crucial period 
1885 to 1905. To aid comparisons, I have categorised their ideas according to the type of 
concepts of competition they held. 
11 Competition as an institution . 
History has labelled Veblen the leading American Institutionalist economist of the period, but 
two others, Clark and Hadley, also discussed competition in terms of an institution. They 
shared Veblen 's notion that institutions are habits of thought, customs, conventions of 
conduct, and even principles of right and propriety. Most economists of the period found it 
natural to discussed ethical and moral questions of competition behaviour, and all three 
offered a wide social analysis in preference to a neutral scientific account of how competition 
had changed over time. 
1I.i Clark and competition as rivalry in service. 
John Bates Clark (1847 · 1938) is generally regarded as one of the foremost American 
economists of his generation.9 His two major books were dominated by questions of the 
dis tribution of wealth, and competition was central to this topic, but in different ways. In his 
• Like many economists o f his generation and nationality, he studied 
in Germany, adopted the Germanic view of society as an organic unit, and 
acquired at least a veneer of historic ism and a belief in state 
intervention. Later on he gained a reputation as one of the founders ot 
marginal theory; he stressed the role of soc iety in determining the value. 
of utilities. Along with Richard Ely and Henry Carter Adams, he ia 
regarded as one of the three f ounder s of the AEA in 1885, committed to the 
reform of e conomics (though see Coat s, 1960) . 
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fIrst book, The philosophy of wealth (1886), he developed an institutional ana lysis, based on 
his observation that "true competition", "a rivalry for public favor" which somewhat 
resembled a race, was being replaced by "a bargaining process having the capacity to become 
a quasi-combat" (P65). Under the older sort of competition, personal relations were 
amicable, or even non-existent, for society intervened: "under a regime of free competition, 
whoever sells the thing he has produced, sells it to society . .. Under free competition, the 
world is seeking to serve us, and we buy what the world, not a chance producer, offers" 
(p85). The new competition changed the relations between buyers and sellers: "a bargain 
becomes a contest of strength in which one man's gain is another man's loss, a transaction 
which is liable to strain the personal relations of the participants, and even to render them 
surly or desperate" (p66). 
The changing nature of market-place relations was paralleled, and causally linked, to the 
changing nature of firm competition from "conservative", to "destructive" or "cut-throat" and 
thence to combination (pI20). Conservative competition is where competition is restrained 
by customary elements of "goodwi ll" and "sense of right" making competition moderate and 
tolerant (P122).1O The effect of the industrial revolution and the introduction of machine 
processes changed the economic relations between people and the "ethics of the market" 
(P123). The small producer/retailer was put out of the field and a new competition was 
introduced between producer and sellers, not present under the old system of small shops and 
conservative competition. The action of "service" to the customer had given way to "rivalry" 
between large firms, and competition between them became increasingly fierce and 
destructive. 
,. He referred here to Mill' s treatment of prices as ruled by both 
competition and c u stom (see Mill, 1848 , Bk 11, Chap IV). 
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Clark believed that unrestricted competition was incompatible with the notion of a "society": 
• 
"rivalry in gil'illg is, therefore, the essence of legitimate competition. It is the function of 
moral influences to see to it that the process retains this character" (p 155, italics mine). In 
Clark's historical analysis, moral forces had grown with society to limit competitive 
impulses: the "just price" had been followed by the "market price", and both had involved 
competition under moral restraints. Without such moral forces, competition slipped back to 
cruder forms such as fraud, force , "higgling"", or in the America of Clark's day, the 
"modem bargain" in which each man was out for as much as he can get: 'The theory of the 
modern bargain appears to be that of the mediaeval judicial combat : let each do his worst, 
and God will protect the right" (pIS9) . A bargain involved some element of unequal 
exchange. ll Crowing over a "good bargain" seemed to Clark to be characteristically 
American, not because of lack of moral influence in US (indeed it was stronger than 
elsewhere) but because the US economy had reached the degenerate days of the competitive 
system (large firms and combinations) before Fr.lnce, Germany or Britain. Because of a lack 
of ethical principles, modern competition also had the effect of levelling down the moral 
values of businessmen and thence the community. If one businessman behaved badly, the 
others have to follow suit in order to stay in businessl1 For Clark, a new era of 
competitive principles and new mode of competition required a new moraJ influence. 
'Higgling', desc ribed by the contemporary anthropologist Henry 
Maine, was the bat-galning free of mo ral influences whi c h took plac e At the 
- md rk- o r bounddl"Y between n o n - neighbourhood sellers and buyers (with the 
impli c ati o n o f exploitati o n in the ou t come) . 
" Fo r Clark, the ' bargai n' was assoc idted with spec ulation which 
a p peared to involve the a c quisition of wealth by immoral means , for no 
service was in vo l ved in simply buying chedp dnd selling dedr; wherea. 
merchants, retailers, etc . were producers of utilities to others. 
Speculati o n could not be entirely condemned becAuse it was 4 WAy of 
acquiring wealth fr o m time utility (see his footnote on pI7) . 
This was believed to be particularly evident in the ldbour field, 
where o ne employer paid l ow wages to hire dn unemployed man, then rotated 
ot her wo rkers, rehiring them at l owe r wages. Other employers then had to 
follow suit and so the general leve l o f wdges declined . Addma (1887) 
responded to Cldrk's wo rri es by sugges ting thdt s o me competitors resi.t 
levell ing d o wn by compe t ing on qUdlity rather than on price. He 
recommended thdt the stdte use legislat ion to rdiae the 'plane of 
compet iti o n- to d higher mo ral le ve l. 
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In this early institutional and historical analysis, C1ark dealt with competition as a set of 
conventional rules of behaviour, rather than a timeless law of nature. He could not regard 
modem competition as a scientific ideal, but did recognise that it had provided a useful, if 
imperfect, way of producing and distributing wealth in the economy, soon, he forecast , to be 
replaced with some beller method. As we shall see, he later changed his mind in favour of 
competition (section IIIjii) and then he found a perfect and ideal role for it (section IV). 
I1ji Hadley and competition as a process of adaptation. 
Arthur Twining Hadley (1856-1930),14 like C1ark, disc ussed the competition that he saw 
around him in the modern American economy in terms of an institution, one with a past and 
a future and not as a natural law true for all time. I~ But that does not mean that he saw 
competition as an entity about which one cannot theorize, and he too believed that economic 
laws and ethics were interconnected. Indeed, for Hadley, ethics and economics were closely 
connected in the changing institutions of the economy (Hadley, 1896, p15-25 and 1906, Chap 
2). Hadley's ideas on competition can be broken down into three aspects: (1) competition as 
an institution (discussed in his textbook, 1896); (2) the economic laws of firm competition (in 
his study of railroads, 1885, which recent scholarship has established as innovatory in the 
theory of cartels and imperfect competition (see Cross and Ekelund, 1980 and 1981»; and (3) 
the ethics of competition (discussed in his 1906 book). I discuss ( 1) and (3) here and (2) in 
section Vjii. Hadley's work demonstrates both considerable knowledge of the competitive 
activity of his day and a sharp grasp of the analytical problems it posed. His approach 
.. Hadley s tudied in Berlin with Wagner, became an expe rt o n the 
economics of railroads and their r egulation, and was a c ti ve in the public 
arena as an e conomist. Like Sumner, he became pro f essor o f political 
economy at Yale (1891 - 9), and then President of Ya le (1899 - 19 2 1 ) . 
I' See Hadley, 1896, p148-S0 . Simi l ar ly, h e r e garde d natural va lues 
and natural distributions as figments of the imaginati o n o f the natural 
rights s chool and rejected them . 
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combined description, analysis and practical problem solving, using a mixture of classical, 
marginal and institutional thinking. 
t 
The institution of competition was conventionally (by classical standards) defined by Hadley 
as the effon of rival buyers to secure goods at least possible price and rival sellers to secure 
as high a price as possible. But, like Mill (whose work he admired), he believed that prices 
were still to some extent fixed by custom rather than by rational calculation and competition 
"with most men, custom regulates their economic actions more potently than any calculation 
of utility which they are able to make",'" custom being an "absence of jUdgment" or 
"survival of habits" (1896, p69-70). Hadley preferred the institution of competition for it 
appeared to have two good outcomes. First, prices fixed by other institutions such as 
ignorance, custom, and monopoly all result in evils: ignorance in buyers causes dishonesty in 
sellers; custom leads to famine or glut; and monopoly in sellers causes discrimination. 
The second argument he made for competition was that it has an unintended consequence: 
when things change, the institution of competition ensures that the economy adapts to the 
new circumstances. So, for lIadley, competition was not only an institution (a conventional 
behaviour or set of rules) but it also provided a process : the competitive process is the 
adaptive process. !-le spelt out very clearly how this Smithian notion of competition worked 
in the modem industrial system and incorporated marginal thinking into it. For example, the 
adaptation process for excess demand is: (I) adjust demand to supply through the competition 
of commercial merchants so that price=marginal utility for buyers (this is temporary market 
price); and then (2) make a pennanent and less accurate adjustment of supply to demand 
through the industrial competition of investors which lowers prices (and marginal utility) 
Fo r Hddley, the mdrglndl utility school's theory explained 'the 
psycho l ogi c al mo tives whi c h determine the relations between price And 
d emd nd' but he though t mu c h o f the work o f Jevons and the Austrians 's •• m. 
t o belong rather to the d Omdin o f psychology than of e conomics, and to have 
d ve ry remo te appli cati o n to the prac tical problems of business and ot 
legislation' (1896, p8D) . 
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until they are proportional to production expenses=normal price (1896, p86-8). Because 
competition was as an institutional rule of individual behaviour, its role is envisaged not as 
an external regulator (as the classical notion of competition is sometimes portrayed) but 
rather as an internal and practical process of adaptation to change . 
Like Clark, Hadley used an historical analysis to show that different forms of competition 
have different ethics associated with them (1906, Chap 2). Although Hadley had praised the 
institution of competition for the fairness and honesty of its outcomes and had written with 
approval of competition as a process of adaptive change, he believed the competitive ethics 
and the associated individualism of the classical school, which had taught that "rational 
egoism and rational altruism" tend to coincide, had been proved wrong by history. Thus, 
Hadley rejected the more usual invisible hand argument in favour of competition on the 
grounds that the nature of the economy had changed and egocentric ism no longer led to the 
public good (1896, Chap I) . "Competition is a good medicine for some diseases; but it 
certainly falls short of being a panacea for all" (1906, p44). 
Hadley also rejected, with equal decisiveness, the Sumnerian view that competition is another 
name for the struggle for existence, for this made force the basis for ethics: "Competition is 
a totally different thing from the Darwinian struggle for existence. Competitive ethics is not 
a mere glorification of force." (1906, p59-60). Hadley shared with Clark and many others 
the notion that "Competition is what its name implies - a simultaneous petitioll or offering of 
services under which the man who offers the best service is chosen . "(1906, p59-60) . But for 
Hadley, the real problem was that these ethics of rivalry in service could not apply to a 
society where free competition no longer exists. Very large finns and monopolists assumed 
they could do as they want provided they obey the letter of the constitution. Pricing was 
highly discriminatory, and tended to be concerned with short run milking of customers rather 
than longer run relations. Public interest considerations were irrelevant as far as the 
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managers of these firms were concerned. As Hadley saw the situation, the ethics of the new 
• business competition had still to catch up with their practices (1906, Chap 3). The new 
institution of "industrial monopolies" was in place, their economic laws were understood (see 
section V.iii), but their ethics were still lacking. 
Il.iii Veblen and competilion as strategic games. 
Thorslein Bunde Veblen (1857 -1929)," like Ihe others discussed here, regarded Ihe process 
of extensive concentralion as a fundamenlal and inevitable change in Ihe nalure of economic 
activily, but he said comparatively lillle about Ihe nalure of competition between firms." 
What he did say, in his book The Theory of Business Enterprise (1904) was, as usual, 
thoroughly original. He was the only economist of Ihe group discussed here who did not 
laud competition. 
Veblen's ideas on compelition and Ihe olher inslilulions associated wilh it are inextricably 
linked with his view of the modern industrial economy and the development of "the machine 
process". The more dominant the machine process became, the more closely interconnected 
were the different sectors in the economy, and consequently the more benefits existed from 
comhining firms' interests. But the actual process of consolidation was an outcome of the 
institulion of "modern business principles" and of the competition between the "captains of 
industry" (1904 , p2-3). 
" Veblen's hist o ry and reputation os one of the leadinQ thinker. 1n 
the Ame ri can Institutionalist s c hool ore well known. One bioQraphical 
poi nt is are wo rth menti o ning here : he studied with both Clark and Sumner 
, as we ll os C. S . Peir c e). 
I f o rbear to dis c u s s here tho se aspects of consumption rivalry 
wh ic h suffer at Veblen's i roni c hand in The Theo ry of the Leisure Clas. 
(1 899) . 
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"Modern business principles" meant that profits were sought not by moving investments to 
the highest returns in commercial or industrial activities, but through "strategic control of the 
conjunctures of business through shrewd investments and coalitions" (P24). The aim of the 
captains of industry was thereby to gain control of large chunks of the industrial economy, 
both to satisfy their desire for power and to take advantage of changes in values associated 
with the interdependencies in the economy (p49). So the older style competition of smaller, 
more equal units, in which competitive activity was conventional but effective (p270), was 
replaced by an "excessive competition" (P31) of very different style." 
Veblen described this new competition between the "captains of industry" in terms of a game 
of strategy, in which the opponent is a rival captain (p30-1). The aim is to do a "deal",lO 
and to reach this point involves a great deal of manoeuvring: "bluffing", "playing for 
position" and possibly even coercion. The main strategic move, and thus the best way to 
force the deal through, consists of blocking some other part of the industrial process by "the 
discovery of new opportunities for putting their competitors at a disadvantage" (p34). One of 
the main weapons was the captain's power over loan capital and his ability to manipulate 
credit for strategic purposes; this meant that the deal was usually accomplished with some 
element of "pecuniary coercion" (p31 and Chap 5). 
In the short run , the game playing nature of competition had a number of undesirable side-
effects. First it interfered with the process of pooling. Following Cla.rk, Giddings and 
Hadley (see sections IlI.iii and V.iii), Veblen, recognised that the cut-throat nature of 
" These 'modern bus iness princ iples ' we re s o we ll unde r s t ood by the 
general public. that a novelist of the p e ri o d c o uld s a tirize them with an 
account of an entrepreneur who combined a gro up of small independent Sunday 
schools into one big school in the Chicago o f his d a y ( s ee No rris. 1903. 
p123) . 
2. Although one of the meanings o f the v e rb "t o d eal' invo lved the 
idea of business negotiations of an unde rhand or secre t t y pe , the usage of 
-deal- as a noun with this meaning appea r s first in Ame rican dis c us si ons of 
political and big business behaviour o f the 18805 / 189 05 (so ur c e : OEO) . 
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competition led the participants at some point to decide to pool their interests. Usually 
several attempts at pooling were needed before a successful combination would hold t~gethc:r 
(Veblen. 1904. p258-62). Each temporary success caused economies in the cost of 
production . with higher profits and lower prices than before. but as long as there were still 
some outside competitors. rivalry remained and competitive investment occurred until profits 
fell again and this led to a wider combination. Not all business men found their interests 
converging at the same time. (or even at all) so there was negotiation and a long drawn out 
struggle before control was achieved. Sometimes the business interests delayed obviously 
beneficial industrial combinations while rivals tried to put each other at a disadvantage. 
Second. business designs were often in connict with best industrial outcomes. so that the 
strategic competition harmed the economy : the continuing regrouping of interests upset the 
"correlations" between the parts of the economy and this caused "expensive maladjustments" 
(p37 -9). 
Thi rd. violent swings in prices. profits and output were caused by the alternation of 
competition and pooling. Competition no longer acted as a regulator (or smoothing device), 
but as a destabilising force: " . . competition in the large industry has begun to shift from the 
posi tion of a stable and continuous equilibration to that of an intermittent, convulsive suain 
in the service of the larger business man's strategy" (p90-I) Only with complete 
consolidation would prices stabilize and the chronic tendency to long-standing depressions 
through overproduction due to the excessive competition be relieved (p263-4).1I 
In the long run, Veblen believed competition led to combination, which he regarded with 
approval. He made the usual points that combinations abolished replication and gave the 
~I Othe rs 41so blAmed big bus in es s f o r the recurrent crises . Parrini 
.. nd Sk l .. r 11983) inte r pret th,s .. s le .. dinll to .. new notion of the market. 
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advantages of economies of scale, both reducing prices and increasing profits. But Veblen, 
no lover of competition, perceived something that his contemporaries with their faith in 
competition could not see, namely that the activity of competing took up much management 
time and effon. "It is in doing away with unnecessary business transactions and industrially 
futile manoeuvring on the pan of independent flrms that the promoter of combinations flnds 
his most telling opponunity."(p47-8) and consequently he saw the greatest contribution by the 
captains of industry as the retirement of lesser business men. In addition , Veblen believed 
that marketing or advertising costs for large flercely competitive flrms (up to 90% of costs) 
was a competitive activity rather than a service activity: its aim was to divert purchases from 
competitors and thus increase market share. Monopolies ' marketing on the other hand was 
informative in order to divert consumption from other non-competing goods (p56-8). These 
wasteful competitive activities would be discontinued with consolidation . 
Another advantage to ending competition was that he believed business men's innuence 
retarded rather than pushed innovation and their control restricted industrial development 
(p44-5). This need not be, but by choice the captains were conservative in innovation . (This 
relates to Veblen 's wider thesis about the importance of the engineers, and the instincts of 
workmanship and idle curiosity.) Veblen dissented from most contemporary opinion which 
regarded competition as the engine of innovation and progress; he believed technical change 
contained the seeds of competition's complete destruction. TIlis movement to consolidation 
was not pan of a natural progression, as it was in the evolutionary thinking of Ely, Sumner 
and even Clark (see section Ill). For Veblen , it was the result of a deep tension and 
incompatibility between the technology of the machine process and the institutions of 
competition: "it appears that the competitive management of industry becomes incompatible 
with continued prosperity so soon as the machine process has been developed to its fuller 
efficiency. Funher technological advance must act to heighten the impracticability of 
competitive business. As it is sometimes expressed, the tendency to consolidation is 
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irresistible."(p266) Veblen predicted that business principles would, in the end, lose oullO 
the machine process. 
For Veblen, the good of consolidation arose out of the evil of competition. This is • 
particular version of the usual invisible hand argument that personal self-inleresl leads 10 the 
best for society. For mosl of his contemporaries (e)(cept perhaps the socialists), consolidation 
arose from competition and both were believed to be good; and if one good did not 
necessarily cause the other, at least their outcomes were not antithetical in virtue. BUI in 
Veblen's formula, as in Mandeville's The Fable of the Bees, the evil (of competition) at the 
individual level led to the good (of consolidation) at the society level. The captains of 
ind ustry and their strategic competitions were the enzymes which brought about 
consolidations, yet Veblen had little but contempt for them and the personal rivalry of 
modern business principles which so outraged contemporary opinion. Their business ethics 
were portrJyed as without any sense of integrity, honesty, and fairness . Like others of his 
day such as Hadley and Clark, Veblen saw this as a problem of a lack of a conventional or 
ethical basis for contemporary business behaviour, rather than as a decline in morality. 
Veblen discussed how the doctrines of natural rights and free contract fitted the regime of 
free competition during the industrial revolution in England (p270). The advent of Ihe 
machine and business era in the post American civil war era had crealed a new standardizing 
fo rce which was both prJctical and altered the way people saw Ihe world.21 BUI thal 
prac tical economic e)(perience had not yet become recognised and internalised into the ideas, 
particularly the legal thinking, of the period: ''The standardization and the constraint of the 
system of machine industry differs from what went before it in that it has had no 
conventional recognition, no metaphysical authentication. It has not become a legal faeL 
11 See Mdyhew (1977) on the importdnce o f Veb1en ' s view thdt the 
practica l experience of intervening in Nat ur e alters our view of the world. 
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Therefore it neither need nor can be taken account of by the legal mind. It is a new fact 
which fits into the framework neither of the ancient system of prescriptive usage nor of the 
later system of free personal initiative." (p275).21 
Veblen's explanation of the interdependency between the economic realities and the legal and 
metaphysical ideas embodied in institutions is much more sophisticated than Hadley's 
explanation of an ethics which had not yet caught up with the practical economics of 
competition. But all such thinking testifies to the perceptions of these turn of the century 
American economists that th~y were witnessing a profound and irreversible change in the 
economy of their nation. 
III Evolutionary theories: competition as a law of nalUre. 
The evolutionary view of the world was made vivid for American social theorists of the late 
nineteenth century, not so much by Charles Darwin, but by Herbert Spencer's evolutionary 
sociology. Accounts vary as to how deep such thinking went in industrial and economic 
circles, and recent literature has tended to downplay the influence of these ideas.14 I find 
myself in agreement with earlier authors: evolutionary ideas informed one of the main strands 
of thinking about economic competition for all five of the economists I discuss . But some 
earlier accounts appear to assume that evolutionary thinking was compatible with classical 
economics because both thought in terms of a laissez-faire response by government. They 
l) For example, under the new system, workmen have d de jure right but 
no de facto power of free contrac t (p277) . 
, . Recent work, whi c h questions whether captains o f industry suc h as 
Carnegie really understood and sincerely believed the theo ry of evoluti o n. 
or merely used the ideas to justify their economic behaviour. is 
represented by Bannister (1979). Of the early wo rk . see the stimulating 
general account of socia l Darwinism by Hofstadter (1944) and the fine 
article by Spengler (1950) who discusses many different aspec ts o t 
evolutionary thinking in American economics . 
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ignored the deeper question as to whether the implied workings of the economy under the 
two systems were compatible. u We shall see here that in some respects they were not. 
Jll.i Sumner and the struggle for existence 
It is appropriate to begin with the ideas of William Gmham Sumner (1840- 1910), whose 
early interest in political economy (stimulated by reading and rereading Harriet Martineau as 
a teenager) and history (reading Buckle at Oxford) was revived by his study of Spencer's 
work in the early 1870s.26 For Sumner, competition was a fundamental: God21 and Nature 
have set the conditions of life such that man must struggle with Nature . In this struggle with 
Nature, men are rivals in a competition in which each has to do all they can to gain a living 
from Nature. "Competition, therefore, is a law of Nature." (Challenge of Facts, 1880s, p95.) 
Sumner argued that competition has taken place in the economic domain only with the advent 
of modem property rights, which give man the right to keep the benefits of his own work for 
himself; without this right , competition becomes violent and military values take over. So, 
economic competition is associated with the move from status relationships (of feudalism) to 
the contract relationships of modem capitalism. (See, for example, "Social Classes", 1883, 
p24-7. This is all pure Spencer.) Nevertheless, when Sumner looked around him, the 
See Lerner (1963 ) and the excellent and wide-ranging account of 
Arneri c dn l a is sez- faire thought by Fine (1957). 
H There is li tt l e doubt thdt Spencer 's inf luence was strong, for 
Sumner success fully f ought the president o f Yale for the right to use one 
of Spencer's book in his te~chln9. Sumner had been appo inted to d new 
cha ir in po liti ca l and socia l science at Ya le in 1872 . Though he is known 
A9 a staunch laissez- fair e economist , his economics was no t strictly 
classica l, and his conservative views are not always predi c table . His 
economics writing consists o f A series o f institutional studies and 
numerous essays. but he is mo re generally remembered as d sociologist, 
because o f a n impr ess i ve final book o n the creation of soc ial mores called 
Fo l kways. 
2' Go d figured mo re in Sumner ' s theories than in tho se o f the other. 
discuss ed here. He was initia lly a clergyma n, having studied religion in 
Europe; and he was he was al so the oldest o f the gro up in an era when 
socia l science Wd S being secu l arized and profess ionalised. 
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competitive struggle remained all too obviously warlike: "Every day that passes brings us 
new phenomena of struggle and effort between parts of the societal organization. What do 
they all mean? They mean that all the individuals and groups are forced against each other 
in a ceaseless war of interests, by their selfish and mutual efforts to fulfil their career on 
earth" (Concentration of Wealth, 1902, pI69). 
The intensity and effectiveness of competition depends on the land-population ratio . Surnner 
argued, in a Malthusian vein, that the more people per area of land, the more intense the 
competition between them and vice versa. The best outcome is a middle range of 
population/land pressure, for this means high wages, cheap food and I:J W rent; men can care 
for themselves and their families, and save capital which is the source of economic 
progress.28 But, too much abundance of land reduces the intensity of competition, life is 
easy and few improvements are made (Earth Hunger, 1896, pI86-8). Thus competition is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for economic progress. 
In Sumner's analysis, the outcome of competition will always be inequality. Natural 
selection operates through competition. The role of competition is to develop the existing 
powers (or talents, skills, industrial virtues, capital assets etc) of people to bring about the 
survival of the fillest firms/people and the failure of the least fil. 2• For example, 
millionaires are a product of natural selection. They may stan OUl wilh inheriled wealth 
(fitness) and if they are naturally compelent (anolher filness) , may increase it; bUl if 
2 1 For Sumner, capital, no t labour. was the crucia l ingredient in 
economic progress and the accumulation of c apital wa s likened to 4 rolling 
snowball (as in Spencer's work) . The f orce o f capital is in turn the 
necessary (but not sufficient) condition t o gain contro l over Nature and so 
create further prosperity. Altho ugh f or Clark and Giddings, competition 
was the primary force or energy, for Sumner, cap ital was the primary f orce 
or stored energy: "capital is for ce, human energy s tored or a ccumulated" 
(Soci"l Cl"sses, 1883, p62 , "nd see Power of C"pital , 1899 ). 
2' Once again, Spencer's evolutionary ideas were dn impo rtant 
influe nce, "nd his phrase "survival of the fitte s t" came to be one of the 
catchwords of soc i"l Darwinian thinking in America . 
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incompetent (unfit) they will lose it all (What makes the rich. 1887. pI52·3). Competition 
helps to produce prosperity and progress. but it also produces poverty and destitution. Such 
variation is a sign of a healthy population for Sumner.lO 
It was an important part of Sumner's argument that Nature itself was neutral in this selection 
process: "nature is fully as well satisfied to make a Sahara. where such is the product of her 
operations. as to make the wheat fields of Iowa or Dakota. Even in Iowa and Dakota. nature 
offers men no wages for labor. nlere are the land. the sunshine. and the rain. If the men 
know how to use those elements to get wheat there. and if they will work hard enough for it. 
they can get it and enjoy it; if not, they can lie down and die there on the fertile prairie" 
(Earth lIunger, 1896, p 174). Since Nature is not beneficent. neither, as a law of Nature. is 
the action of competition. This belief reinforced Sumner's laissez·faire attitudes. namely that 
Man and Government should both be as neutral as Nature. In his famous essay 'The 
forgonen man" (1883) , he argued that by helping the least fit either directly (by charity) or 
ind irectly (via taxes), the middle man weakens both his own power to struggle and the power 
of his capital to make progress in the economy. 
Sumner was clearly in favour of competition· how could he not be in favour of something 
he believed a fundamental law of nature . But he was also in favour of "natural monopolies" 
for two imponant reasons . The first reason was that the outcome of natural selection in 
Sumner 's competition of life was the creation of inequalities and thus concentration of wealth 
and capital (A group of natuml monopolies, 1888. p399) . Thus. monopoly is a natural 
outcome of the fundamental law of competition . Trusts and monopolies are also a good 
10 Ch~ nce t oo is in vo lve d in produ c ing variation: ·Competition do •• 
not g uarantee results corr esponding with me rit , bec ause hereditary 
conditi o ns and g ood and bad f o rtune are always intermingled with merit, but 
compe titi o n sec ures to me rit all the c hdnc e9 it can enjoy under 
c irc ums tanc es t o r whi c h no ne o f o ne's fell o w men are to blame . - (What 
makes the ri c h, 1887 , pl S) . ) Sumn e r unde rstood more of the evolutionary 
mecha ni s ms than Spenc er . who relied o n t he inheritance of acquired 
cha rac teristi c s f o r the ethi c al and phys l c al pro gress of society . 
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outcome, because they represent a more highly organised form of industry and a more 
concentrated form of capital, associated with greater productiveness, higher profits and faster 
capital accumulation. For these reasons, like most of his contemporary economists, Sumner 
portrayed the trusts of his time as the source of the period's prosperi ty . 
Secondly, monopolies are not just an outcome of the evolution of industry, they are an 
important element in gaining control over nature. We have to struggle to get the necessities 
of life out of Nature and we do this by pitting our own skills (a natural monopoly) against 
Nature (another natural monopoly), we gain control over nature and create progress and 
civilization (Another Chapter on Monopoly, 1888). In playing off onc monopoly against 
another, we are, in his words, "employing natural agents" (Trusts and Trades Unions, 1888, 
p257). Monopolies therefore in an important sense form the basis of our created civilization. 
Despite this view that competition via natural monopoly leads to civi lization, Sumner rejected 
Spencer's attempt to join a scientific ethics onto his evolutionary theory of economic, social 
and biological development. For Sumner, competition does not reform mankind ; there is no 
ethical or moral evolution along with the economic evolution, no movement to the ideal 
person or society. Sumner's views were typical of what has si nce become known as 
"conservative social darwinism". This view was in strong contrast to Ely, who shared the 
evolutionary framework of ideas, but whose interpretation of evolution was that of the 
"reform social Darwinist".)' 
11 This useful depic ti o n of evolutionary lai ssez faire versus reform 
politics comes from Goldman (1953) . 
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Jll.ii Ely and competition as cooperation. 
Richard Theodore Ely (1854-1943) regarded himself as one of the leaders of the American 
historical school of economists,)) but his early thinking was dominated by ideas based on 
the nalUral: those of organic arrangements of society and of evolutionary change. His notion 
of economic competition was grounded in his understanding of biological theories of 
evol ution as they applied to man. He believed th is involved two notions: (a) the struggle for 
livelihood which is constrained by the social order; and (b) the dynamic social evolution 
which leads to changes in the social order (190 I, p59)H 
Competition is "the chief se lective process" in evolution and is "a permanent feature of 
human society" (1901 , p64 and 67). But Ely believed that Nature 's selection was different 
from man's selection. In Nature, competition leads to the survival of the physically finest, 
but, as he pointed out, weeds are as fit as crops. In the case of Man, selection also leads to 
the survival of those finest for modem society, bu t society establishes the conditions for 
struggle.3< In contrast to Sumner's neutral Nature, Ely believed that man acts as a regulator 
of competition to encourage those best fined for the constantly evolving society. He 
See his mdnifesto on method (1884) . Ely studied (like J.B. Cldrk) 
wit h Knies dt Heidelberg. He is d lso usudlly portrdyed .os .0 Chri stidn 
soc i dlist, but his SOcidlism WdS typiCdl of the period dnd pldce in being 
wishy-washy dnd reformist (ie "progressive ") rdther thdn revolutiondry; 
nevert heless he hdd to publicly renounce it during .on dCddemic f r eedom Cdse 
dt Wi sconsin in 1894 (see furner, 1975) . Though not regdrded by history dB 
.on economic thinker o f great mer it, he WdS widely influentidl through his 
severd l textboo ks (eg 1889, 1893), I dter editions of whi ch included .0 
margina l analysis. 
The m~in references t o his evoluti o nary thinking about competition 
.ore his 1900 presidentid l dddress on competition to the AEA (1901) and .0 
set o f essdys Studies in the Evolution o f Industrial Society (1903), 
pdr ti cu ldrly Pdrt I, and the eSSdY "Rivdlry and Success·, plS2-63 . The 
latter book inc l udes the f o rmer 1901 essdY, with some revision s (see 1903, 
pI23-1S 1) . 
It Wd S the dndl o gy with pldnt dnd dnim.o l breeding wh ich led Ely to 
this c laim , via the wor k o f A . R . Wdlla c e and the s ocio l ogist L . f . Ward, who 
portrayed human evo luti on 49 different from animal evolution because the 
f orme r was modifi e d by purposefu l a c ti o n . Where Sumner drew on Spencer, 
Ely drew on Ward, but neither copied slavishly. Whilst Sumner rejected 
Spencer 's ethicdl atta chment to evolution , Ely rejected Ward ' s view that 
man's successful evolution amounted t o the suppression o f competition. 
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regarded man's manipulation of nature not as the suppression of compt:tition but as 
improvement on the work of unaided nature.)' Ely's evocative phrase. "man makes 
competition do its perfect work" (1903, p142), encapsulates his vision . 
Not only did competition work better under man's guiding hand than under nature's 
uninterested power, but Ely believed it was beneficent in action and progressive in effect. 
First, in contrast to the biological struggle for existence, in which the reproduction of the fit 
is the only outcome, services are rendered as pan of man's economic struggle so production, 
ideas and the economy are all stimulated (1903, p 158-9). This complements Cl ark 's notion 
of competition as rivalry in service which he also used directly (190 I , p70). Second, in 
further contrast to Sumner who observed that the struggle for existence was a war-like 
activity, Ely believed that "Cooperation is the great law of soc ial life growth" (1903, p!!9) . 
This reflected both a strand in current social theor/" and Ely ' s observations that 
individualism had given way to unconscious co-operation and thence to conscious 
cooperation in the economy (eg the Granger movement and the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, and in other senses: combinations of labour and capital , old age pensions) 
(1903, p90-I, p 162-3). Third, while the competitive struggle in Nature is unconstrained, 
man's struggle is constrained by the social order. It is limited by custom, institutions and 
laws, which themselves undergo evolution so that society improves. Founh, Ely's 
" Ely wante d to differentiat e hi s vi~w fr o m Spence, 's theor y o f 
natural selectio n whi c h was unconsc i o u s, r ather t hd n IDd ni pulat e d ( s ee Ely, 
1893, Bk I, Ch a p 10) . Nevertheless , f o r Ely as f o r Sumner, the unfit o r 
feeble are still likely to be left o n the ru bbi s h heap. They sho uld be 
treated with hUIDdnity, but not encourag e d t o become depe nde nt : ' a g ood 
socia l measure must stre ngthen the individua l and the group f o r 
competition" (1901, p66) . 
" He ref e renced Kropo tkin's sugges ti o n that ab i l i ty t o coope rate is a 
weapon in the struggle for exi s tenc e in connecti o n with thi s s entimen t 
(1901, p61). 
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cooperalive, socially manipulaled compclilion led 10 spiriluaVmor41 progreu (in COnlrUl 10 
Sumner 's compclilion which was morally neulral) .J1 
The~ nOlions were applied by Ely 10 a r.lthcr standard hislOriCaJ description of Ihe sUI"es of 
economic developmenl and 10 lhe evolulion of economic rclalions and inslilulions. His 
oUlline of lhe evolulion of compclilion wilhin lhe induslrial economy began Wilh lhe SUlic of 
universal competilion, an idealized classical world in which "compclilion among i IMic 
numbers of producers" which would "fix a nalUral price aUlOmalically" (1903, p63). The 
second slage was onc of biller or cUl-lhrOal compelilion (which had earlier exciled Ely's 
sympalhy for lhe employer, sec 1893, p58) and which caused lhe conct:mration of indusuy In 
lhe period afler lhe Civil War. Finally, IllOS1 rt:ccnlly, he ob~erved lhe Ihird stage of 
inlegralion, chardclCrised by lhe elllergenct: uf combinalions which had ~curt:d "harmony and 
unily of aClion" 10 achieve more OUlPUl wilh the leasl inpul, and wilh lhe leasl waSlC (11103, 
p91 -2). 
Yel lhe evidenl lension belween lhe law of coopt:ralion and lhe compclilive slJ1Jggle for 
exislence remained a problem and source of confu~ion in Ely's analysis of compclllJon \o\'lIll1n 
social evolulion. This ambiguilY was reinforced by his (waning) commilrnem 10 socialism 
which appears 10 have been Slronger emolionally lhan imt:lleclUally. Ely stalCd several times 
lhal compelilion was "lhe comerSlOne of lht: social ordt:r" (1901, p58; 1903, p97) bUI hc 
believed compelilion was conslrained by lwo olher vilal e1emenls in lhe economic sociely of 
his day : one was lhe inslilulion of privalt: properly; and lhe olher was lhe lendency towards 
lht: equalily of opponunily in economic compctilion (1901. p69)! By focusing on man', role 
in changing sociely and in manipulaling compclilion, Ely had hoped 10 presenl i view of 
If There were two other el..tm~nts In the evolut Ion tow4l"ds the ld •• l 
Indn: the role of reliQlon WAS -t o r41a~ competition to hlQher p14o\li.-
(1901, p70) (an echo of Adam ' s Influential 1887 paper which attributed euch 
cS role to the stAte); And th~ o th~r W4S Spvocv r ' a L4ffi4f Ck14nlam . Th •• 
implie s the inheritanc e of a C<.jllll"d ch"lac teristic9 (Impli c itly Ely think. 
only of desnable onesl) and thus th .. l" osP," c t fOI "",n .nd aoci .. ty to 
improve (190), pI29-)2). 
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competition which avoided what he tenned the "anti -rational" view (the view that competition 
is against the interests of society) as well as the "ultra-rational" view (the idealized notion of 
• world ruled entirely by competitive self-interest) . He was not entirely successful. 
lII .iii Clark and economic Darwinism 
In a revealing anicle 'The limits of competition" (1888)lI, Clark provided an evolutionary 
analysis of the dynamic manifestations of competition in the American economy of his 
period. Though written soon after his first book detailing institutional aspects (1886), Cl ark 's 
attitude toward competition had shifted a little in its favour . He shared Sumner's belief that 
competition is inextinguishable, and shared Ely's belief that cooperation is the natural end 
point of competition . His co-author. Giddings, was al so innuenced by Hadley ' s analysis of 
large finn competition and pooling (see section V.iii) . 
Clark depicted the competition of Ricardian economics as "economic Darwinism" for the 
industrial revolution had created a new type of competition "a struggle for existence" between 
·panies of unequal strength" that is. a struggle between "competitors of the new and 
predatory type" with the old "peaceable type" (1888. p2). 'The process was savage" but in 
the long run, the survival of the stronger was desirable because machines and factories meant 
cheaper goods and a better standard of life. This process was also transient, so laws derived 
from observing it were unlikely to apply when the struggle was over. Hence . Ricardo had 
observed the struggle. but what he really saw was that the "social organi sm was perfecting 
itself for its contest with crude nature" (p2). Clark saw that the struggle had given way to 
centralized finns . but he no longer believed that competition disappeared in this newly 
organised society. merely that the mode of competition had changed . 
" Originally written o n h i s o wn i n 1887, then plac ed in conjunc t ion 
with another of his own papers and two arti c l e s by Giddings in a small 
collec ti o n titled Mod e rn Distribu tive Pr oce ss (1888) ; r eferenc es are to 
thi. vers ion . 
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Clark el( tended Cilime~' thesis of non-competing occupational &roups in the British labour 
marh t" to the American output market . where he saw that employers had erc:cted &reat 
barriers agai n~t competition 10 control the supply and prices of their products. "This 
apparent ly wholc:salc abrogallun of ewnomic law was unthought of by early c:conollllSU". 
but "while we Ithe economi>l~1 ~lc:pt . as it .... ere. and dreamed of the rq;ulallon of villuCI by 
the autuma tic now of capital tu the point~ of h.ghe~t profit . the pnnclple apparently ceued 10 
opera te within very el(temive fields" (p 10). This did nOI mean thal compelition "the old 
regulating principle" was not work ing any longa. Rather. "True competition is limited by 
nalure 10 the strata" (p 12). within group competition is the dimension of real competition; 
only fi rms already in an industry compete. 
But. as Clark noted. within some groups. "wmpetilion has e J. tenninalcd the weal produceR. 
and becoming fiacer liS Ihe survivors bew me fewer and monger. is compellin& Ihem. in the 
end. 10 unite or peri~h" (pl3) so Ihat comblll~l i on~ re ~ulted . Why do {inns move from 
preda tory competition 10 union·! In illally. the finm which comblllC: arc lho~ lhal compclC 
within the gro up. but once the number uf cumpelltur ~ i ~ few . it i~ ea~y tu poul. lhls !hen 
IUrns the energies uf the group outward>. IU cumpele Wilh other indu~lnal group~ (e& 
railroads with other trusts) so that a ne w indu>trial war breaks OUI across the lines of !he 
indu,tr ics . But even if all groups became cumbinat ions . Ihere would still be "residuill 
compcti tion " between the combinat ions of e4ual stre ngth in different industries. and belween 
the cumbi nations and the re>1 of society. 
C I .. rk h .. d s Ulllle.t"d suc h .. n .. n .. ly s 19 .n ha 1886 book . but h4d not 
deve l oped t h e i d" .. there. C I .. rk cl ... m" d th .. t C .. i r ne s · 187' the sis no 
l o nger ~pp li ed 1n Ame rl c 4 bec au s e modern produc t i o n me thods had obllterAted 
t he div id i nll I.ne s be tween I .. bour . I ns t e .. d ove r the I .. st 10 ye .. rs. there 
h .. d be en .. I mo s t u n. vers .. 1 I .. bour mo b .l.t y l · pote n t ... 1 compe tit. o n extend. 
t o eve ry p a r t o f the . ndu s t r ... 1 t. ~ l d . n wh i c h men wo rk .n or \l4n.zed 
c o mpan ie s · ) so t h .. t w"lIes had b e en l e v e ll ed . due t o .nc r .. .. sed educ 4t.on ; 
new countr i es ha Vi ng le ss 11 n~s o f d~ nw1 [ C d t 10 n; 4 nd tha 4do IJ tl o n o f ma c hine 
proces s es etc .. 11888 . p 7 - I OI . 
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There were two interesting elltensions of this analysis . Both Clark and his co-author 
Giddings discussed whether the combination would be stable. Clark thought that a successful 
combination depended on equality of the firms involved: "The surviving competitors [who 
make up the combinationJ must be few, strong and nearly equal. Marked inequalities of 
strength among the members of the group defer the formation of the union, or break it when 
it is formed prematurely" (Clark, 1888, pIS), while labour and capiLaI could still move within 
the pools and in and out of the pools. Giddings, in his paper "The persistence of 
competition" (1888) , believed the "combination equilibrium" was "at best, an unstable one ... 
The relative advantages of members as possible competitors cannot remain long unaltered. 
And however nearly equal they may be at any moment in economic strength, they will be 
unequal morally" (Giddings. 1888. p22) . They may also be unequal in productive efficiency 
or in innovatory power, which may renew the competition within the group while outside 
capital may also force competition back into the group. Combinations for Giddings were 
defensive organizations, whereas competition was an offensive activity. But neither 
competition nor combination were likely to be stable . 
Clark's second elltension was to Caimes ' notion of "potential competition" (ie from those 
outside the group), which came in his two books on monopoly (1901 and 1904)." Potential 
competition was the threat that new firms would enter the industry if prices (and therefore 
profits) were overly high : "The mill that has never been built is already a power in the 
market. "(I90I, pI3). Clark thought that potential competition was better than actual 
competition because it worked more smoothly and benignly than the actual competition : 
potential competition "relieves the harshness of more overt competition which forces both 
wages and prices to low levels. There will be a quiet and real force at work which will 
ensure a certain justice in the filling of wages and prices" (1904, p 122). But the action of 
t. B~ ckhouse (1990) no tes the hist or ic~ 1 import~nce o f this notion 
which re~ppe~rs In B~umo l ' s contest~ble m~rkets . 
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potenl ial competition was not necessarily real . Succes~ful combinations, by filting price$ and 
production could limit both real (ie actual) and potential compelition. Cl ark envisaged that 
potenl ial competition would only work in the same way lIS actual competition if it were nOl 
blocked by "abnonnal" or "unfair" compelition by the trusts. Abnonnal competition meant 
selling below costs, and was usually combined with unfair competitive pr.lctices, namely 
selling at discriminatory prices and with non -standard supply policies to different groups or 
people ." "Fair" competition involved price-CUlling justified by any real cost or efficiency 
advanlage stemming from beller organization of the work , economies of size,'l innovations 
of technique , management etc etc.. Unfair and abnonnal competition were considered bad 
for three reasons : I) they prevenl potential competition; 2) they force "fit " firms out of the 
market; and 3) they diston competition elsewhere in the economy. 
Thus fo r Clark. changes in the nature of indu~try and in the way competition did its work 
were part of the evolutionary process. Competition worked in the dynamic economy to 
ensure the sUlvival of the fillest. and this led to centralized production and combinations. 
But competition was not elttinguished : residual competition still operated between grouP$ and 
even within the groups, and potential competition always remained at work . 
IV Competition as an agent of natural law~ : ('lark anci competi tion as economic ether. 
Though Clark in I X!!5 had been highly ~u~picious of competition, by the turn of the twentieth 
century , he had fallen in love with the notion of compet ition as a f undamenlal agent or 1C1Ol 
" In" I"ter vel"S l o n at hIS 19 01 book wi t h hi •• on J . H . CIArk tl9lll. 
they pO I nted ou t two pr ot- Iems: 11 th .. t the only eV1denc .. on .. h .... th .. t 
po tent 1"l compet1tion wo rked 15 it .. c tu .. 1 compe tition occurr .. d ; 21 th .. t the 
u n t "ir me thods a t comp~titi on w~r .. o nly untd1r it pr .. c t1 .... d by .. monopo ly. 
ffidking the is sue I nt~nt t o drl Vd out o f the md r k&t rather than intent to 
compete . 
S ize ( a t s C41eJ "ttl c l~rI C h!S Ph:;:' lItl on.ed Includllid tho se ot 
superVision, use of m4 c t) lnery. eftl c l~(j c y o f c apitAl a nd sel1100 .y.t ... . 
in the economy. The institutional and dynamic (evolutionary) notions of competition in his 
earlier work (section 1I.i and lII.i ii) were supplanted by competition as some all -pervasive 
entity. enveloping and acting on men and on the economy at all points and times rather like 
some son of powerful economic ether. This notion of competition played a central role in 
the workings of the economy as discussed in his major theore tical work. The Distribution of 
Wealth (1899) . which developed earlier ideas to produce a fully articulated scientific theory 
of value and its distribution. 
Competition works in three interconnected ways in his model of the economy. First . 
competition was the all -powerful agent which made the economy tend to its ideal static state : 
"there is an ideal arrangement of the elements of society. to which the force of competition 
acting on individual men . would make the society confonn. The producing organism actually 
shapes itself about this model. and at no time does it vary greatly from it." (Clark. 1899. 
p68). In order to explain what he meant by his idea of an economy defined by static 
laws." he resoned to a natural law analogy of water in a hydraulic model: the ocean 
appears governed by the dynamic forces of waves and tides. but these are less powerful than 
the static forces which work constantly to keep it tending to its natural level. Cl ark 's idea 
economy was characterised by prices which are at one and the same time "natural " (the old 
classical tenn) and "nonnal " (the more recent label . meaning the result of lelling the 
economy work freely without disturbance (p29» and competitive (p77). So he proposed the 
equality: natural=nonnal=competitive=static .... although this state is never actually allained 
Statics was defined in terms o f as stable po pUlati o n, cap ital, 
methods o f produc tion, f orm o f fi rms, and consumer wants . It excludes 
dynamics (li kened to hydrodynamics) and any evoluti o nary c hanges in 
.ociety . 
Clark ' s "no rmal" definition is as in Ma rshall and Mar sha ll (1879, 
p65 - 7) , a discussion taken up in later editions of Marshall's Principles 
(5th edition, 1907 , onwards) where he denies that no rmal =compe titive (p347 
in 8th edition, 1920) . See Ha c king (1990) f o r a discussion of the term 
-normal - in nineteenth cen tury s c ienc e ~nd s oc iety. 
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because of "frictions" or imperfections in the market delaying the effects of the worunlS 01 
the sta tic laws, and because of the less powerful dynamic forces at wor!.; (p406). 
Second, competition ensures economic justice: it ensures that employers pay labour the value 
of his marginal product and acts to similar effect in the: other factor mar!.;ets . From this 
Clark offers onc of the ftrst (or perhaps mo~t IUl:id)H ellpositions of the neoclassical theory 
of distribution : that in the static case, payments to the factors ellhaust the product when each 
receives its marginal product. Competition thus ensures an ethical distribution of income. 
Third , competition ensures efftc ient apportionment of capital and labour between lICuvitiu 
because: "Competition acts as a Ic:veller in reducing the earning power of the ftnal incremenlS 
of di fferent men's capital to equality. This it does by putting out of the fteld the competitor 
whose last increment of capital . . creates less than the standard amount of product" (p2S4· S), 
that is, "under perfe:ct competition"" labour has the same power to produce value in one 
part of the system as in another, and the same for capital (p2!10). 
The ethereal quality of Cl ark 's notion was enhanced by the fact that he rarely linked his 
notion of competition to the individuals in the economy. Very occasionally, he discuued 
competi tion in relation to motivation : 'There are impulses that cause men to do othu thinp 
than to compete with each other in business; but competition is the activity which eau," 
prices to be, in the customary sense of the term, natural. This proce:ss is, in realilY, I rivalry 
in serv ing the publac . . The mutive: is, of course , self interest; and the aClion thal resullS 
from il is a spontaneous and general effurt to get wealth" (p77). Competition here is /10( lhc 
" See e n try o n J.B . ( lalk ln the N~w Pa 1gra ve . 
.. The t e rm waa not o ft ~n us vd ~y ( Ia,k, t hough It had been much u •• d 
by ,." not h er Amell c an e c ono mlst . F . A . W41ker . 10 c o nnectlon with W4Q. 
comf'etit i on. for W41kllll , perfec t conL...,.tltion me dnt .omethln~ atronger t~n 
c ompe t i ti o n free from 1e9a1 restralnta Itree competiti o n) ; It meant 
competit i o n unhindin"ad by con stl 4 1n ts o t lJovlltrty. Ignoran c e, moral 
con s iderati o ns et c (see hlS 1876 , (ha~ . X) . 
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motive," but it provides the "process" or "activity" by which the motive is played out. 
Clearly, C1ark's entrepreneurs do not aim to carry out three functions of competition when 
they indulge in the activity of competition. This leaves a worrying gap between the 
action/process of the individuals and the economic ether, suggesting that at least an 
unintended consequence type of argument is needed as a bridge between the two levels. 
Much more usually in C1ark's book, such an argument is unnecessary, for competition is an 
outside agent of natural laws rather than a spontaneous action of individuals : "it is 
entrepreneurs who do the moving, and it is competition that makes them do it" (p289). 
There is something in common between Cl ark 's notion of competition as an agency of 
natural laws unconnected to the individual and elements of both classical thinking and later 
neoclassical ideas. Granted, Clark's ether notion is unlike Smith ' s view of competition as an 
activity stemming from the individuals' desire to buy cheap and sell dear. But, it is similar 
to the notion of competition as a natunllly conceived universal regulator that some Americans 
believed true of classical, particularly, Manchester laissez faire economists. No doubt Clark 
was familiar with Walker's attack on the laller, which characterised their competition as 
follows : "Competition to have the beneficent effec ts which have been ascribed to it, must be 
all · pervading and unremilling; like the pressure of the atmosphere of which we are happily 
unconscious because it is all the while equal within and without us, above and below us . 
Were that pressure to be made unequal, its effects would instantly become crushing and 
destructive. So it is with competition" (Walker, 1876. pI63). 
Clark is rightly credited with helping to define the neoclassical notion of "perfect 
competition", by laying out the market conditions under which his static ideal type of 
. ' I do not think he ha s in mind c o mpetition as a primdry motive f o r 
h. does not refer to anything like a compe t itive instinct o r spirit. 
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competition would work ." Cl ark 's theoretical assumplions about competition lUld lIS 
, 
OUlcomes were crucial to his model, and he was only too aware that his assumptions would 
appear peculiar in his period: " 10 many persons any theory based on competition may $Cem 
to have somewhat of a character of theoretical romance. Will not competition soon be I 
thing of the past?" (Clark, 1899, p440), not because of attainment of static SUlle:, but bcclU$C 
of growth of combinations. Here Clark proposed to go back to his more realistic dynamic 
analysis: "It remains for economic dynamics to show that competition is an inextin&uiihlblc 
force. The consolidations of the present period change the mode of its (competition'sl 
action, but they do not destroy it; ilnd therefore they in no wise invalidate a theory that 
assumes the existence of il" (pM I). 
V Competition as an economic law. 
Clark's static notion of competition remained largely unconnected with economic actOf1 weh 
as finns and consumers, and because: of this seemed to noat Ctlually unconnectc:d to the 
economic laws. Sumner made some allempt to spell out such Iin~s for hiS evolutlonaty 
theory, but he was not nearly as explicit as lIadlcy and Ely. They both proposed ecOROIllK 
laws of industry competition which were IIn~ed tu the finn behaviour of the period, and ITC 
recognbably modem in analytical terms. 
V.i Sumner anct the relation of economic laws to competition . 
Like Ely and Spencer, Sumner regarded the modern capitalist economy as a complex 
biological organism not a physical mechanism. In this organism, competition does not 
directly determine economic outcomes, rather economic (or social) laws and forces inlCfYclIC 
See St1\jler 19S7 , who .. Iso sU\j\jests th .. t lt w ... throu\jh Clork'. 
work theSt the no tions ot pelfQ c t ("umvwtlt l o n and at4tlonalY equll1brlu. 
bec .. me identi fied . 
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between competition (the law of nature) and the economic outcomes. Economic forces (such 
as the self-interest motive and capital) are natural in the sense that they act with regularity 
under economic laws (such as the law of diminishing rent and the laws of supply and 
demand)." (See Commercial Crises, 1879, p46-50) An example may help to make 
Sumner's ideas clearer: Wages are not determined by prices, or profits, but are regulated 
directly by the laws of supply and demand; these in turn relate directly to the forces of self-
interest which are unleashed only by the competition of life . Sumner wrote: "Su pply and 
demand does not mean that social forces will operate of themselves; the law, as laid down, 
assumes that every party will struggle to the uunost for its interests - if it does not do so, it 
will lose its interests. Buyers and sellers, borrowers and lenders , landlords and tenants , 
employers and employees, and all other panies to contrac ts , must be expected to develop 
their interests fully in the competition and struggle of life. It is for the health of the 
induslfial organization that they should do so." (Strikes and Industrial Organization, 1887, 
p42). So, though competition was the fundamental law, Surrmer conceived of the economic 
laws (not institutions) as being the glue that held the parts of the economic society together. 
V.ii Ely : competition and economies of scale. 
Ely shared in the common belief, of all economists of the period that competition lead 
inevitably to large-scale production and trustificat ion; indeed for them all, this was a matter 
of historical reality . And, like Sumner, Ely supposed that competition created large firms in 
the modem economy through the mechani sms of an economic law, but Ely's law was linked 
more firmly to both individuals and firm behaviour. Ely argued that the motive for business 
is gain, and those methods which provide most gain will drive those which provide less gain 
out of the field . But only in some industries is increasi ng size associated with increasing 
•• Oth~r f o rces are merely c o nventi o nal and historical : e9 the idea 
that all non - m~nt .. 1 I .. bour 15 d"gr .. ding . The .e t Ol c es .. re eff e c tive. but 
.r. not r.llabl. a c ross time .. nd sp .. c e . 
gain. Here he adopled Henry Carter Adam 's (18117) analysis of returns 10 scale :" In 
, 
manufacturing there are constant returns to scale. and competilion will be a steady pressure 
which is constructive. stimulating and beneficent. In agriculture. there are decreasing returns 
to scale. so lillle producers will always remain. Increasing returns 10 scale denotes a ratural 
monopoly. usually utilities. lrJnspon. communications industries etc .; in these industries. 
competition will be an intcmlillcnt rivalry (a lemporary but destructive war) followed by 
collusion (see Ely. 18811. Chap XIX). 
V.iii Had ley and lhe law of large fiml compelilion 
The economic law governing lhis process of compelilion and collusion was first and moSl 
ably discussed by Hadley. Wilh whose ideas and work Veblen . Clark. Giddings and Ely were 
all fa miliar. The new theory for this economic law was based on his observalions of the 
behaviour of railroads. articulaled in his book on thal subject in 11185. and expanded 10 the 
general case in his 11196 textbook (see Cross and Ekelund. 19110). 
From the earlier discussion of I\adley's in~lilUllonal ideas (seclion lI.ii) we know that Itlldlcy 
believed he lived in an age in which legal rCMrJinlS and physical constraints had disappeared. 
leading to the abolition of legal and nalural monopolies (based on physical or geographical 
consideralions). In their place. he saw thal the so-called "free compelition" had created a 
formidable syslem of "industrial monopolies". where lhe busines~es involved "make 
competition practically illlpos~ible" (whereas a natural monopoly is where "compeution is 
physically impossible") (Iladley. 111115 , p64 -77). Since industrial monopolies were a new 
institution. and the old theory failed to explain their behaviour. /ladley saw lhal a new 
economic theory of competition was re4uired. 
This, 1n turn, h .. d p. o t. .. t.ly t. .... n .. d o pt .. d Ly Ad .. ma tro m Jevon.' 
wo,-k . I Am indebted to A . W. Co .. ts , who "lIo"",,,d DIe to ' .... d hu unpubll8hed 
mdnus cript on Adams. 
Conunenting from American experience. Hadley argued that the first farms cultivated are not 
the best but those requiring least capital outlay. The same was true for fums : with 
population and market growth. we see a move from a minimum of fixed capital to much 
higher levels so that the proportion of fixed to total continues to grow (1896. p 125-7). Two 
facts were important. I) when fixed capital is large. the firm experiences high interest 
charges and maintenance costs and low variable costs; and 2) large fixed capital is very 
difficult to move. and to do so usually involves much loss to the investors. In these 
circumstances. classical economics is incorrect. for price competition no longer "furnishes a 
natural regulator of prices, with which it is wic:ked to interfere .. . Ricardo's theory was 
based on the assumption that when payment fe ll below cost of service active competition 
would cease. lIis theory fail s. because. far below the point where it pays to do your own 
business, it pays to steal bu siness from another man. The influx of new capital will cease; 
but the fight will go on, either until the old investment and machinery are worn out. or until 
• pool of some son is arranged ."(1885. p7() · 2.) In lIadley's ana lysis. price competition and 
new entry continues until price=variable cost (or, as Il adley called it . the handling costs). and 
It this point no new finn enters the market. 
But. this does not end price competition between existing firms . for in further opposition to 
the classical view. lIadley (like others of his day) observed that in this new son of 
competition. the smaller the number of competitors. the more intense the competition (1896. 
p 117). This was because in the new competition. there is no natural limit. The loss from 
stopping production is so great (since major expenses such as debt servicing and capital 
equipment maintenance. run on just the same). that the enterprise may go bankrupt but is still 
present in the market and becomes an even more reckless competitor. Writing about a 
specific railroad war. Hadley noted "It is all very well to Ullk of free competition and 
survival of the filles!. But permanent competition is virtually out of the question. And 
survival of the fillest is only possible when the unfillest can be physically removed - a thing 
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which is impossible in the case of an unfit lIunk line." (1885 . p99). There being no nalural 
• limi t to the new competition . an artificial limit is found in combination. or in the monopoly 
principle of determining prices by agreelllelll of sellers (18115. p74). 
Hadlcy did a case by case analysis to predict the outcome of competition for firms with IAI,e 
pennanelll capital investment: 
I) firms which faced competition in all their markets . would have to set prices equilllO !heir 
variable costs in all markets. and would therefore face ruin. 
2) fi nns which faced competition in some markets would fi. prices equal to variable C05lS in 
those markets. and prices to cover fi.ed costs in the non-competing markets; that is . it would 
have to practice price discrimination in order to make profits . 
3) finns fac ing competition nowhere fi. prices to cover fi~ed charges. and musl already be • 
monopolist or a member of a pool ; if the laller. it will most likely cnd up in a combination 
agreemenl (18115. pI42-3). 
Using his new economic law of large firm compellllon . I ladlcy could e~pl 'lln both the 
competitive pricing behaviour of firms to Ulelr CUSlUmers and the compeullve intcracuon 
between firms. 
VI Divcr,i ly and Ob\crvational Cirl" Ulmldn l"es 
The five economiMs discu~scd here interpreted the phenomena of the new compellllon in 
such different ways that their e~planations involved novel and disparate definltion5 01 
competit ion and they developed a number of unconvelllional theories lIboul it. 
It might be argued thal I Slacked the odds in favour of diversilY by choosing these particular 
five economists . This is true . It was my purpose to seck out the full nange 01 viewl by 
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picking economists traditionally regarded as at the boundaries of opinion : one has been 
labelled the leader of the Institutionalists (Veblen); one has been hailed as the American 
marginalist (Cl ark); one as a traditional scholar of the old school (Hadley) ; one a Christian 
lOCialist (Ely); and one a conservative free · trader turned sociologist (Sumner) . Not only do 
my five bear different labels given by history, but in their time, when professionalization 
panly proceeded th rough academic freedom cases and there was a strong pressure to 
conform, these economists largely stood out for their views. Two of them fought academic 
freedom cases (Sumner and Ely), two of them led the reform movement for historical 
economics against Manchester laissez ·faire economics (Clark and Ely) and one was the only 
economist e~c1uded from membership of that movement (Sumner). lIadley always looked 
secure, but only Clark also later joined the establishment; Veblen remained an outcast." I 
chose these economiS15 precisely because they were likely to disagree. I was rewarded not 
just by five notions of competition, but more. for several of these economists held different 
notions concurrently to e~plain different aspects of competition. How can we account for 
this? 
The conventional route to understanding why Ely in particular was a cooperative social 
Darwinist and Sumner in particular a conservative social Darwinist begins with their family 
circumstances. their mentors. and their intellectual milieu. This infonnation should also help 
to e~plain the more interesting question of how Cl ark. with a simi lar background and study 
e~perience to Ely. developed a different theory and notions of competition. These accounts 
offer an input·output type of e~planation : specific individuals come to hold the beliefs that 
they hold because personal circurnslances. learning and conlemporary ideas feed in . and 
theories and prejUdices come out. TIli s approach offers an indirect e~planalion for variance 
in views and theories .'1 
'I For the pla ce o f these five 1n contemporary e cono mi CS , see A. W. 
Coat. (1960) and M. O. F'urner (197 5) . 
Two ouc h a ccount. ar~ availab le In FIne 11956) a nd Ro s. (1991) . 
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The 4ucstion I raised in Section I. and want to explore funher here. is whether we can offer 
• an account for the diversity in views held by these economists based on structural reasonl 
rather than individual or sociological ones. Earlier. I appealed lO a medical analogy and the 
case of AIDS . Doctors faced an important new disease apparently unlike any other. My five 
nineteenth-century economists faced an C4ually new and imponant economic phenomenon. a 
dominant new son of competition between large finns. one which did not confonn to existin& 
rules of economic behaviour, and was not covered by existing explanations. Although 
classical economics offered a strong thesis about the beneficial regulatory effects of the old 
son of competition, it had little to offer about its likely development and behaviour or actionl 
under other circumstances. So, for example, when Hadley reviewed Ricardo's theory, he 
found it wrong for the new competition. Both as an abstract idea, and as a set of customary 
rules of behaviour. the classical notions of competi tion proved inapplicable in the new 
circumstances. The new phenomena demanded new theories and the opponunity for diversity 
was open. 
Opportunity is necessary but not suffic ient. We also need to understand how my group of 
five economists were able to entertain more than five different notions and theories of 
competition when faced with the same observational circumstances? A funher argument il 
necessary. I have assumed that my five economists, like most scientists. viewed the 
economic environment as a source of useful information about their subject. If the nature of 
tha t evidence were clear cut. then the many different elements involved in competition misht 
be ranked and a consensus view as to notions and causes might emerge. But, I arllue. for 
di versi ty to occur, the five economists must have picked on differem aspects of competition 
as they saw it, and so developed different definitions and theories. This suggests that the 
nature of the evidence must have been ambiguous and the circumstances open to diverse 
imerpre tations. 
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This ambiguity argument is well supponed by the long experience of evidence for economic 
laws. Such evidence emerges, if at all , from the muddle of everyday life rather than in the 
controlled laboratory environment. Economic observers have to separale out the real wheat 
from the disturbing chaff. "Nature" rarely shouls "Yes" or "No" for economisls, perhaps only 
in times of crisis are the workings of economic laws seen at all clearly (for example, during 
hyperinnations) . In normal limes, economists fix on differenl aspects , just because lhe 
evidence is muddled, or even seems to point in different directions . 
For this argumenl to work here , we have lo be salisfied bOlh lhal evidence of the new 
competition was as my five economists sugge sled , and lhat lhey used lheir observalions on 
the real world around them as starling points to develop their diverse lheories.H The 
question of the accuracy of lheir observalions is a difficult one, but it is possible to measure 
their evidence against lhal of modem hislorians working on the period. It is comfoning to 
find that economic hislorians have tended lo agree wilh the conlemporary economi sls: lhe 
competition of the period was a new son of competilion and America was the first lO 
experience it. The period has been memorably portrayed as the firsl developmenl of large 
scale industry (Chandler, 1977) and the first period of freely negoliated monopolizalion on a 
grand scale (for references see Poner, 1973 and Lamoreaux, 1985). The business history of 
the period renects the concurrent development of cuHhroal competition and price wars 
(Lamoreaux, 1985 and many olhers) alongs ide a period of growing cooperalion of which 
combinations were one example (see Ross, 1977-8). AlIlhe main observalional starting 
points (save perhaps for Clark ' s "elher") for my economisls ' lheories and nOlions are well 
supponed by subsequenl research inlo the American economy of lheir lime. 
" See Stigl er ' s (1 960 ) d i scus s i o n o f the envi r o nme nt .. l i nfl uenc e o f 
events o n e conomi c t he o ry . 
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On lhe related question of their use of evidence, it is ceJUinly the case that all the five 
, 
economisls began lheir accounlS Wilh various observations on the phenomenon of large scale 
finns and motivated lhe ir lheories wilh descriplions of the new competitive practices. Much 
of this has been indicaled in lhe leXI of the paper, where I have described the SOrls of 
observations lhey made, and lhe way lhey were used in their arguments. Somelimes their 
sources are obvious, for example, Hadley's law of large finn competilion was derived 
direclly from his observalions of railway behaviour, with which he gained detailed 
acquainlallce early in his career as a wriler for The Railroad Gazelle and other journal&. 
Veblen's account of compelition as a strategic game relied on evidence given to 
governmental invesligations and could have been as easily constructed from reading accounts 
of deals in the financial press of lhe period. Others' sources are not so clearly cited, bul 
lhere were many contemporary discussions of lhe: new compelition which gave detailed 
descriptions of finn behaviour. For example, Sumner's vision of competition as I 
fundamentally nasly economic slruggle law is evidenced by the criminal cases of the period, 
"dramatized" into a more popular format by Lloyd (1894) and fictionalized in Bellamy', 
novel Looking Backward (l1!1!1!) . ~ 
Lel me commenl funher on two more difficult examples of the relalion belween economic; 
ideas and the evidence of lhe period . One is Ely's concern Wilh cooperation, which now 
seems Ihe mOSl ill · filling element of his ideas on economic competilion in lhe evolutionary 
framework, and lhe one leasl supponed by consequenl hislorical developmenl. He apparently 
drew lhis lhesis from social lheory of lhe period, and il would be easy 10 dismiss il as 
utopian. bearing lillle relation lO the world around him. BUI the notion was mirrored in the 
real economy, for commentalOrs like Ely nOll:d that the co·operative movement was growin" 
and combinations of employees matlhed those of big business. Above all. the 
" Lloyd drew on transcripts at cour t proceedings and evidence to 
f ederal a nd state bodies etc to tell the story of Standard Oil'. 
compe titive behaViour . 80th It. and 8ellamy'. utopian SOCialist novel were 
widely read . 
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interdependence of the economy had become considerable: no longer was the American 
market a series of local or regional markets. The unified capitalist economy of late 
nineteenth century America matched in many respects the unconsciously cooperating 
industrial society depicted by Spencer. The law of social evolution ponrayed as a law of 
increasing cooperation might be reasonably justified by the characteristics of Ely's world as 
reported by those around him. The fact that economic texts of the late nineteenth century in 
America (and in Britain) included long descriptions of existing cooperatives and serious 
analyses of cooperation testified that if Ely's view of the future was deluded, it was a shared 
delusion based on the evidence of their era. 
The second example is more subtle . Clark 's early suggestion that service gave way to rivalry 
in the practice of competition has the appearance of nostalgia, yet the idea was echoed in the 
work of Iladley and more clearly developed by Veblen in his discussion of the rivalrous 
nature of competition . Clark's thesis began with the observed personal relations of the new 
competitors. When there are a considerable number of firms involved in an industry, or 
considerable numbers of buyers and sellers, it may be as Adam Smith puts the matter: "a 
competition arises", it is relatively impersonal activity, one firm amongst many, and the 
immediate concern is the firm ' s relationship with customers. When there are few firms, 
Clarit and Hadley noted that competition becomes cut-throat and destruc tive , competitors 
know their rivals, compete directly against them, and as Veblen saw, measure their success 
by their own share of the market or ability to control it. That some captains of industry 
really thought consciously in such terms about competition in the late nineteenth century is 
evidenced by a quote that Chandler (1959) uses from a newly merged conglomerate: at the 
turn of the century: "'n the past , the managers of large merchandising corporations have 
found it necessary, for success, to control or limit competition . So when this company 
started, it was thought that we must control competition, and that to do this we must either 
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figh t competition or buy it. The first meant a ruinous war of prices; the $«000, • COnll&l'1I1), 
increas ing capitalization ... )) 
, 
My thesis that new notions of competition could have aJl been based on observations made in 
the period can be supponed with a single doubtful exception. That is Clark's notion of 
competition as an abstract ether or force acting on the economy. Although it is difflcull 10 
see how he could have any direct observational evidence for such an entity, there wu an 
indirec t route between his observations and his development of the idea. Clark was 
commiued to a new theory of value in 111115 but not to competition as an imponant element 
in that theory. He then developed his opinions on the inextinguishable nature of competition 
from his observations on the competitive behaviour of large finns in the economy and 
incorporated these ideas into his dynamic evolutionary economics of the later 181105. This 
view, that competition was always somewhere at work, was then lrolnsfonned into hil idu of 
competition as an all pervading force in his static ideal model of the 11I90s. In Cl ark " 
subsequent writing on monopoly, his observation of residual competition (based on the 
recurrent wars between combinations) turns into the unobservable potential competition, 
nice ly compatible with his static notion . 
The outward signs of competition at work in the late nineteenth ·century economy were 
compatible with Sumner's competitive struggle along with Ely's cooperative competition, and 
Clark ' s abstract force along with Veblen's habits and c ustoms. But, in arguing for the 
imporlance of multifaceted evidence to explain the diversity of views amongst economisu of 
the period , I do not want to argue against the complementary accounts provided by 
intellec tual or cultural history . If there had been no social Darwinism in the America of the 
18805, then Ely and Sumner would have had no evolut ionary holders for their theories of 
~\ An nua l Re por t o f t he tJd tl o na l BI SCU it Co mpany t o r t he yvar ending 
Dec e mber! 19 0 1 ; January 3. 1902 . 
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competition. If there had been no classical economics. there would have been nothing ror 
Clark and Hadley to reformulate . If there had been no existing prejudice in favour of 
competition. there would have been nothing for Veblen to contradict But. if there were no 
new phenomena. none of these interesting notions and theories of competition would have 
arisen. 11 is in this sense that I argue observation and evidence of the new phenomena must 
have been the source for the competing notions of competition in late nineteenth -century 
American economics. Without it, American economists might have passed unhindered along 
the conventional historical path from free to perfect competition . 
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